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HOW SOUTH KOREA CAN IMPROVE ITS CARBON
MARKET: THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
Many countries across the globe have been endeavoring to mitigate the
impacts of global warming. The key to achieving this goal is to reduce the
emission of carbon dioxide, the main driver of global warming.1 Thus far, a wide
variety of policies have been developed and implemented in an effort to reduce
carbon emissions, and these policies can be classified into two broad categories:
non-market-based approaches and market-based approaches. 2 Command-andcontrol regulation, reporting requirements, and promotion of research on
renewable technology with subsidies are a few examples of non-market-based
approaches.3 These approaches can be fairly described as direct regulation of
pollution-producing activities.4 For instance, command-and-control regulation
involves setting a standard to govern performance; specific examples could
include prohibiting the use of energy-inefficient technology or prohibiting a
party from emitting carbon dioxide beyond a predefined limit.5
Market-based approaches differ in that they involve indirect regulation of
parties’ behavior by modifying their economic incentives. 6 As opposed to
directly regulating parties’ behavior, market-based approaches let the parties
themselves decide whether to adjust their behavior in response to the modified
economic incentives.7 Two prominent examples of market-based approaches are
the carbon tax and emission trading scheme (ETS), the latter being a term that is
often referred to as cap-and-trade.8 These two approaches are similar in that they
both put a price on carbon emissions, clearly indicating that they involve a
1
See The Causes of Climate Change, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2019). CO2 and carbon dioxide are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
2
See generally Market-Based Climate Policy Instruments, CLIMATE POL’Y INFO HUB,
https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/market-based-climate-policy-instruments (last visited Mar. 29, 2020); NonMarket-Based Climate Policy Instruments, CLIMATE POL’Y INFO HUB, https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/nonmarket-based-climate-policy-instruments (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
3
Non-Market-Based Climate Policy Instruments, supra note 2.
4
See id.
5
Id.
6
Market-Based Climate Policy Instruments, supra note 2.
7
See id.
8
Clemens Kaupa, “Market-based” Approaches to Regulating Emissions: Cap-and-trade and Carbon
Tax, MEDIUM: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (Nov. 28, 2016), https://medium.com/climate-change-law/7-nationaland-regional-regulation-of-emissions-i-market-based-approaches-cap-and-trade-and-b128755a82c5.
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market system. 9 In addition, both approaches have been supported by
economists who argue that adopting at least one approach would be an ideal
solution for governments seeking to mitigate the problems of global warming at
the lowest possible cost.10 The argument for a market-based solution, which has
been voiced by many economists, has led many governments around the world
to consider implementing either one or both of these approaches.11
Regardless of scholarly debates over which market-based approach is better
suited to accomplishing the goal of cutting emissions, this Comment focuses on
cap-and-trade because it is the policy choice that makes international
collaboration feasible. As opposed to implementing a carbon tax which is solely
determined by the sovereign power of a state, implementing a cap-and-trade
program would, by virtue of possible linkage between cap-and-trade programs
of different countries, involve joint efforts between members of an international
community. South Korea has been operating the second-biggest carbon market
in the world.12 However, this market possesses several inherent flaws that relate
to its cap-and-trade program.
In Section I, this Comment explains how the two market-based
approaches—carbon tax and cap-and-trade—help reduce carbon emissions. In
Section II, this Comment provides information about how countries such as the
United States, the nations of the European Union, China, India, and South Korea
have thus far implemented cap-and-trade. Next, in Section III, this Comment
looks at the three most important international agreements with regard to global
warming, agreements that were established by recognizing the importance of
international cooperation in combating climate change. Lastly, because it is
often difficult for the international community to speak with one voice, this
Comment proposes two viable solutions for countries where building a
consensus is problematic. Section IV of this Comment will pay special attention
to South Korea, proposing that South Korea should link its cap-and-trade
programs with the cap-and-trade programs of other countries. In addition, South

9
See Xueman Wang, Putting A Price on Carbon: Nations Opt For Market-Based Solutions, WORLD
BANK (Mar. 6, 2014), https://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/putting-price-carbon-nations-opt-marketbased-solutions.
10
See Grantham Research Institute, Carbon Tax v. Cap-and-Trade: Which is Better?, GUARDIAN (Jan.
31, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/31/carbon-tax-cap-and-trade.
11
See Noah Kaufman, Carbon Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade: What’s a Better Policy to Cut Emissions?, WORLD
RES. INST. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/carbon-tax-vs-cap-and-trade-what-s-better-policy-cutemissions; see generally ETS Map, INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, https://icapcarbonaction.com/ko/ets-map (last
visited Mar. 19, 2020).
12
INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, KOREA EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 1, https://icapcarbonaction.com/
en/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=47 (Sept. 15, 2020).
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Korea should provide non-participating countries with financial assistance so
that they, too, can develop viable cap-and-trade programs of their own; in so
doing, South Korea can effectively counteract negative impacts imposed by noncooperating countries and therefore, contribute to the global response to climate
change.
I.

MARKET-BASED APPROACHES IN REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS:
CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE

A. Carbon Tax
A carbon tax, one of the two prevailing market-based approaches, is an
added cost imposed by the government on each metric ton of carbon dioxide
(CO2) emitted.13 Because it creates an additional tax burden for emitting carbon
dioxide, businesses will most likely seek ways to reduce their carbon emissions
in order to avoid paying the additional cost. 14 As a result of a carbon tax,
businesses may switch to cleaner and more environment-friendly technology
that emits less carbon dioxide, or alternatively, may simply decide to emit less
carbon dioxide to save money.15 One advantage of implementing a carbon tax is
that governments can raise revenue by imposing prices on carbon emissions.16
The revenue can then be invested in developing environment-friendly
technologies or policies to further reduce carbon emissions. 17 In addition,
because a carbon tax is a fixed cost determined by the government, it provides
polluting entities with certainty as to costs that they will incur as a result of
emitting a certain amount of carbon dioxide.18 Knowing the costs in advance
will help the polluting entities better plan their carbon emission reduction
strategies.19
However, there are two main disadvantages of a carbon tax. Although a
carbon tax provides certainty as to the price imposed on carbon emissions, it is
less likely than cap-and-trade to achieve emission cuts, which will be covered in

13
Erik Haites et al., Experience with Carbon Taxes and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems, 29
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 109, 111 (2018).
14
See Kaupa, supra note 8.
15
See Carbon Tax Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/carbontax-basics/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
16
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 293, 350 (2008).
17
See CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., supra note 15.
18
See id.
19
See generally id.
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the next Section, I.B.20 This is because the tax does not directly regulate the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted by polluting entities.21 It is true that the carbon
tax disincentivizes polluting entities from emitting carbon dioxide by making
them pay extra costs for doing so; however, because the carbon tax is not a
“quantity-based approach[,]” it is not clear how effectively it would reduce
carbon emissions. 22 Instead, the carbon tax is more similar to a price-based
approach.23 Even with the carbon tax, polluting entities can still emit as much
carbon dioxide as they want provided that they pay for it. In addition, a general
animosity towards taxes in the business community is another disadvantage of
the carbon tax.24 Because businesses generally dislike paying taxes, there would
likely be more resistance to any implementation of the carbon tax scheme—
unlike cap-and-trade, as mentioned in Section I.B.25
B. Cap-and-Trade
In contrast with a carbon tax, cap-and-trade is a “quantity-based approach”
to lowering carbon emissions.26 The system of cap-and-trade entails a cap, or the
maximum amount of carbon that can be emitted, and trade, which is related to
the buying and selling of carbon emission permits.27 As opposed to a carbon tax,
cap-and-trade is more closely correlated with the market economy in
determining the price of emitting carbon dioxide.28
The cap-and-trade system generally works as follows. First, a government
places a cap on carbon emissions.29 Then, the government distributes permits,
otherwise called allowances, for emitting CO2 to the polluting entities through
various methods. 30 For example, the government can choose to sell permits
through an auction, distribute the permits for free, or a combination of both.31
These permits ensure that the amount of carbon dioxide emitted remains under
the cap.32 After the initial distribution of carbon permits by the government, the

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See id.
See id.
See Stavins, supra note 16, at 352.
Cf. id (stating that cap-and-trade is a “quantity-based” approach).
See id. at 351.
Id.
See id. at 352.
See Market-Based Climate Policy Instruments, supra note 2.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Stavins, supra note 15, at 316–17.
Kaupa, supra note 8.
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distributed permits can be freely traded in the so-called carbon market.33 Market
prices for the carbon permits are then determined based on supply and demand
for the permits, and polluting entities can freely buy and sell permits depending
on their individual needs.34 Unlike a carbon tax, governments are not directly
involved in setting the price for emitting carbon dioxide; instead, cap-and-trade
lets the market decide on its own, without direct intervention by government.35
Over time, governments can tighten the cap to eventually decrease the aggregate
carbon emission.36
The cap-and-trade mechanism provides numerous advantages to both
polluting entities and governments. 37 First of all, cap-and-trade would likely
spur the invention of low-carbon technologies.38 Just like the carbon tax, carbon
permit prices established under a cap-and-trade scheme are an additional burden
on polluting parties.39 The less carbon they emit, the less money they have to
spend on purchasing carbon permits; therefore, carbon permit prices would
incentivize polluting parties to create innovative technologies that would
alleviate the financial burden imposed by emitting carbon dioxide.40 In addition
to saving money for polluting parties in the present, the invention of new
environmentally-friendly technologies would undoubtedly contribute to further
CO2 reduction in the long term.41
Second, cap-and-trade provides polluting entities with flexibility.42 Because
the carbon permit prices are determined by carbon market, the price will
fluctuate by reflecting changed circumstances. However, cap-and-trade allows
polluting entities to take advantage of fluctuations in price because they can buy
permits when prices are low and use them when permit prices are high.43 In this
way, the cap-and-trade approach allows entities to behave strategically in
complying with the carbon emission requirement. 44 This advantage
33

Market-Based Climate Policy Instruments, supra note 2.
See id.
35
Id.
36
Cf. Stavins, supra note 16, at 326.
37
See generally ALEXANDER EDEN ET AL., BENEFITS OF EMISSIONS TRADING: TAKING STOCK OF THE
IMPACTS OF EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS WORLDWIDE, INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP (Adelphi, July 2016).
38
Id. at 16.
39
See Market-Based Climate Policy Instruments, supra note 2.
40
See EDEN ET AL., supra note 37, at 17.
41
Id. at 17.
42
See id. at 4.
43
See Katelyn Roedner Sutter, California-Quebec Market Continues to Thrive, ENV’T DEF. FUND:
CLIMATE 411 (Feb. 27, 2019), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2019/02/27/california-quebec-market-continuesto-thrive/.
44
How Cap and Trade Works, ENV’T DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-trade34
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distinguishes cap-and-trade from a carbon tax because the carbon tax lacks
flexibility because a government sets a fixed price on CO2, which is unlikely to
be adjusted promptly in response to changed circumstances. 45 Moreover, if
polluting entities successfully achieve more CO2 reductions than expected, they
could even earn a profit by selling unused permits when permit prices are high.
Cap-and-trade even allows polluting entities to maximize their economic profits
by acting in ways that are environmentally friendly. 46 This is yet another
incentive given to polluting parties to further reduce their CO2 emissions.
Third, cap-and-trade provides governments with another opportunity to
achieve further CO2 reduction by connecting its cap-and-trade program with
those of other countries. If two or more carbon markets are linked, the expanded
market will result in more trade of carbon permits, due to having more
participants in the market.47 This will, in turn, reduce the cost of cutting carbon
emissions—just as mass production reduces the overall cost of manufacturing.
By lowering the cost, carbon emission permits will be more palatable to market
participants.48
Lastly, cap-and-trade enables governments to exercise complete control over
the amount of carbon dioxide emitted, and in doing so, provides the governments
with a great deal of certainty that their respective emission targets will be
achieved.49 Governments can set a carbon reduction plan and based on the plan,
tighten the cap every year or at regular time periods.50 This enables governments
to effectively lower the total amount of CO2 emission over time while also
giving them the ability to track how well they are conforming to their reduction
plans at various intervals.51
Cap-and-trade has been already implemented by many countries around the
world, including the European Union, the United States, China, India, and South
Korea; moreover, many other countries are currently considering implementing
cap-and-trade.52
works.
45
Cf. IETA, BENEFITS OF EMISSIONS TRADING (Mar. 2015), https://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/
101s/ieta-emissions-trading-101-library-april2015.pdf.
46
Cf. Sutter, supra note 43.
47
IETA, supra note 45.
48
Id.
49
ENV’T DEF. FUND, supra note 44; see also Stavins, supra note 16, at 310–11.
50
See ENV’T DEF. FUND, supra note 44.
51
See id.
52
See generally INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, supra note 11. According to the Emission Trading
Scheme (ETS) map on the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) website, countries that are currently
considering implementing cap-and-trade programs include Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil,
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II. CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED
STATES, CHINA, INDIA, AND SOUTH KOREA
A. The European Union
The European Union has been a pioneer in the field of carbon emission
trading by implementing the world’s first cap-and-trade program—the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 53 Since being implemented in
2005, the EU ETS remains the biggest carbon market in the world.54 The EU
ETS covers about forty-five percent of the European Union’s carbon emissions
from power plants, factories, and airlines.55 Also, the EU ETS is divided into
several trading periods, otherwise known as phases.56 Thus far, there have been
three phases: Phase I (2005-2007), Phase II (2008-2012), and Phase III (20132020).57
The first phase was considered a pilot phase—the phase in which the
European Council was able to learn lessons regarding the design of their carbon
market. 58 For instance, during Phase I, a problem arose when there was an
oversupply of permits in the market, which caused the carbon permit price to go
down.59 As a result of the low carbon permit price, the Council was not able to
achieve as much reduction as they anticipated.60 However, in Phase II, having
learned from previous experience, the European Council was able to increase
the permit price by reducing the number of permits distributed.61 During Phase
I and Phase II, by means of the increased price caused by reducing the maximum
number of permits distributed in the market, the EU ETS was able to leave a
clear impression on Member States that emitting CO2 is costly and that reducing
future emission trajectories makes sense economically.62 As a consequence of

and Turkey. Id. A few states in the United States—Oregon, Washington, and New Mexico—are also considering
a cap-and-trade approach. Id.
53
EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets_en.
54
Id. If China’s carbon market is finally launched, the EU ETS will become the second-biggest carbon
market in the world. Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Chandreyee Bagchi & Eike Karola Velten, The EU Emissions Trading System: An Introduction,
CLIMATE POL’Y INFO HUB, https://climatepolicyinfohub.eu/eu-emissions-trading-system-introduction.
58
See id.
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
David B. Hunter & Nuno Lacasta, Lessons Learned From the European Union’s Climate Policy, 27
WIS. INT’L L.J. 575, 588 (2009).
62
Id. at 591.
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the EU ETS, Europe has been in a better position to take the lead “in a carbonconstrained future.”63
In Phase III, the EU ETS expanded the areas that were covered by the
program to include aviation emissions and other industrial sectors that had yet
to be covered by the program.64 The most noteworthy change in Phase III was
that the EU ETS was able to become “fully integrated at the EU level” by
replacing Member States’ respective emission targets with “a single, EU-wide
ETS target[.]” 65 In other words, the cap-and-trade program in the European
Union finally began to operate as one centralized scheme that controls carbon
emissions in Europe. 66 It is clear that after each phase ended, the European
Council revised the market design so as to reflect any market deficiencies that
existed in previous phases.67
Running the world’s largest carbon market for more than ten years, the EU’s
carbon market has proven to be effective in lowering carbon emissions.68 For
instance, the industries covered by the EU ETS, such as power plants, were able
to achieve 4.1% carbon reduction in between 2017 and 2018, whereas industries
not covered by the EU ETS were only able to achieve 0.9% carbon reduction.69
In addition, the European Union’s carbon market appeared to have maintained a
relatively high carbon permit price that continues to provide polluting parties
with incentives to modify their CO2-emitting behaviors.70
The next phase of the EU ETS, Phase IV, is expected to begin in January
2021 and will last until December 2028.71 Through the 2030 Climate and Energy
Policy Framework, the European Council reaffirms that emission trading will be
the primary means of achieving the European Union’s emission target.72

63

Id.
Id. at 590.
65
Id.
66
See id.
67
See id. at 584–90.
68
See EUR. COMM’ Progress Made in Cutting Emissions, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/
progress_en (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
69
See id.
70
Hunter & Lacasta, supra note 61, at 589.
71
Bagchi & Velten, supra note 57.
72
EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE: INTERNATIONAL CARBON ACTION PARTNERSHIP (ICAP) STATUS
REPORT 2015 [hereinafter EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE].
64
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B. The United States
The United States, the second-largest CO2 emitter in the world, has no
national cap-and-trade program even though there have been several attempts to
implement such a program nationwide. 73 Nonetheless, several states in the
United States have already initiated efforts to alleviate the problem of global
warming by implementing their own cap-and-trade programs.74
The first cap-and-trade program in the United States was the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a regional program designed to target carbon
emissions from the electricity generation sector.75 The program was launched in
2009, and initially, seven states from the northeastern and mid-Atlantic regions
took their first steps to implementing RGGI.76 As of January 1, 2020, ten states
were participating in the program.77 New Jersey rejoined the RGGI in 2020; in
addition, since the passage of the Clean Economy Act in February 2020, Virginia
has also been in the process of joining the program, with a goal of starting in
2021.78
RGGI only covers the power sectors of the participating states. 79 This
approach was clever in that state governments did not have to incur additional
monitoring costs because power plants in the United States already had an
obligation to report their carbon emissions to the federal government.80 RGGI
distributes carbon permits through auctions, and as an added benefit, the
proceeds generated from the auctions are invested in renewable energy and
energy efficiency programs that contribute toward mitigating the impacts of
global warming.81 Since going into effect in 2009, RGGI has been found to be

73
See Iman Ghosh, All the World’s Carbon Emissions in One Chart, VISUAL CAPITALIST (May 31, 2019),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/all-the-worlds-carbon-emissions-in-one-chart/; CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLS., Market-Based State Policy, https://www.c2es.org/content/market-based-state-policy.
74
See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Existing Cap-and-Trade Programs to Cut Global Warming
Emissions (Nov. 9, 2007), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/existing-cap-and-trade-programs-cut-globalwarming-emissions.
75
THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
76
Id.
77
Id. The seven states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
and Vermont. As of January 1, 2020, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New Jersey were participating in the program. Id.
78
Bruce Ho, Back to the Future: New Jersey Rejoins RGGI Climate Program, NRDC (June 17, 2019),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/bruce-ho/back-future-new-jersey-rejoins-rggi-climate-program; Carlie Clarcq,
Virginia Set to Join RGGI – A Massive Step Forward for Cap-and-Invest, CLIMATEXCHANGE (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://climate-xchange.org/2020/02/19/virginia-set-to-join-rggi-a-massive-step-forward-for-cap-and-invest/.
79
THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 75.
80
See Stavins, supra note 16, at 369.
81
See Sarah Shemkus, As States Look to Cut Transportation Emissions, RGGI Offers a Model – And
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successful in achieving a forty percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions
among the participating states.82
Furthermore, due to the success of RGGI, states participating in RGGI are
now planning to expand this successful program to the transportation sector,
which surpasses the power sector in emissions.83 Nevertheless, careful attention
is required in designing cap-and-trade for the transportation sector; an “issue of
equity” arises because of the differences between the transportation sector as
opposed to the power sector.84 Unlike electricity, access to transportation differs
by location and income levels.85 Therefore, fairly distributing the benefits and
burdens arising from the cap-and-trade program among people of various
income levels would be difficult if not impossible. 86 Regardless of these
difficulties, however, cap-and-trade is still one of the most effective means of
limiting carbon emissions, and it is therefore strongly recommended that a capand-trade program be created for the transportation sector—the sector which
produces the largest percentage of total carbon emissions in the United States.87
More importantly, California is a state that is at the forefront of combating
climate change through implementation of its own cap-and-trade program.88
Based upon the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32),
California launched its own cap-and-trade program in 2013, which in turn has
become the fourth-largest cap-and-trade program in the world.89 Despite initial
criticism, California’s cap-and-trade program has proven to be effective insofar
as it has gradually contributed to the reduction of CO2 emissions.90 For instance,
from 2012 to 2017, California achieved five consecutive years of emission
reductions.91 Moreover, California was not only able to lower carbon emissions,
Room to Improve, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 5, 2019), https://energynews.us/2019/02/05/northeast/asstates-look-to-cut-transportation-emissions-rggi-offers-a-model-and-room-to-improve/.
82
ACADIA CTR., RGGI States Leading the Way Toward Economic and Environmental Success (Sept. 25,
2017), https://acadiacenter.org/rggi-states-leading-the-way-toward-economic-and-environmental-success/.
83
See Shemkus, supra note 81.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
See EPA, Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions, https://www.epa.gov/
greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
88
See CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., California Cap and Trade, https://www.c2es.org/content/
california-cap-and-trade.
89
Id.; see generally CAL. AIR RES. BD., Assembly Bill 32 Overview, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/
ab32.htm (last visited June 9, 2020).
90
See Michael Hiltzik, Column: No Longer Termed a ‘Failure,’ California’s Cap-and-trade Program
Faces a New Critique: Is It Too Successful?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-captrade-20180111-story.html.
91
Katelyn Roedner Sutter, Full Compliance, Declining Emissions, Robust Action: It’s November in
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but also to prove that their economy could flourish in concurrence with efforts
to protect the environment.92
In addition, on January 1, 2014, California linked its cap-and-trade system
with that of Quebec, a Canadian province. 93 The linked carbon markets are
governed by Western Climate Initiative, a non-profit corporation that was
created to facilitate the effective operation of the market through a set of
guidelines.94 Under the linkage, permits issued by California and Quebec are
recognized by each country, and polluting entities in both regions are allowed to
buy and sell those permits across the border.95
Moreover, the linked carbon market is also proven to be working. 96
Indicators of carbon market viability include steadily increasing carbon permit
prices, as well as a relatively low number of unsold carbon permits in the
market.97 That is to say, steadily increasing carbon permit prices and few or no
unsold carbon permits are strong indicators of market effectiveness.98 According
to the data released by the California Air Resources Board after their fifteenth
permit auction, the carbon market created by the linkage of markets between
California and Quebec appeared to have such indicators; the price of carbon
permits reached the highest point ever in the linked market, and there were no
unsold carbon permits. 99 As the permit price increases—or as emitting CO2
becomes more expensive—polluting parties will undoubtedly try to emit less
carbon and they will seek to develop more effective methods of reducing their
carbon emissions, creating a virtuous cycle that would help reduce the overall
level of CO2 in the atmosphere.100

California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, ENV’T. DEF. FUND (Nov. 21, 2018), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/
2018/11/21/full-compliance-declining-emissions-robust-auction-its-november-in-californias-cap-and-tradeprogram/.
92
See id.
93
See Jean-Gregoire Manoukian, California-Ontario-Quebec Harmonized Cap-and-Trade Program –
Compliance Digest (Dec. 8, 2017), https://enablon.com/blog/california-ontario-quebec-harmonized-cap-tradeprogram-compliance-digest/. Ontario joined the linked carbon market between California and Quebec on
January 1, 2018; however, the newly elected Premier terminated the linkage in July 2018. Id.
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MARK PURDON ET AL., The Political Economy of California and Quebec’s Cap-and-Trade Systems,
SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY 5 (2014).
95
Manoukian, supra note 93.
96
See Sutter, supra note 43.
97
See Melanie Curry, Latest Cap-and-Trade Auction Shows Strong Results, STREETSBLOG CAL (May 22,
2019), https://cal.streetsblog.org/2019/05/22/latest-cap-and-trade-auction-shows-strong-results/.
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See id.
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C. China
China has been the largest carbon emitter in the world since 2006 and the
country has been responsible for about thirty percent of global carbon emissions
over the past decade.101 The United States emitted the most carbon dioxide in
the world until 2006, when China’s emissions surpassed that of the United
States.102 Ever since then, China continues to hold the title of the largest carbon
emitter.103 China’s carbon emissions impact the entire world; nevertheless, for
many years China had neglected to take care of this increasingly worrisome
situation, claiming that dealing with increased carbon emissions would hinder
economic growth.104
However, as of 2011, China has begun to change its attitude towards
environmental concerns and has taken actions to reduce its carbon footprint.105
In 2017, China expanded its pilot program from “seven experimental markets”
and announced a plan to launch a national carbon market.106 Although the initial
plan, which involved launching a national carbon market by 2017, has been
delayed, the Chinese government expects the first trading of carbon permits to
happen in 2020.107 When the market is operational, the Chinese government
expects it to be the largest carbon market in the world, surpassing the current
largest carbon market in the world—the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS).108 Even though China’s carbon market will only cover the
coal-fired power industry, the amount of carbon emissions that will initially be
covered by the market will be twice the amount of carbon emissions covered by
the EU ETS.109

101
See Ghosh, supra note 73; Thomas C. Frohlich & Liz Blossom, These Countries Produce The Most
CO2 Emissions, USA TODAY (July 14, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/07/14/china-uscountries-that-produce-the-most-co-2-emissions/39548763/.
102
Frohlich & Blossom, supra note 101.
103
See id.
104
Mat Hope, Analysis: China’s Big Carbon Market Experiment, CARBON BRIEF, (Sept. 2, 2014),
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-chinas-big-carbon-market-experiment.
105
See id.
106
Id.; Muyu Xu & Michael Martina, Update 1 – China Expects First Trade in National Emissions Scheme
in 2020, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-china/update-1-chinaexpects-first-trade-in-national-emissions-scheme-in-2020-idUSL3N21H02B.
107
Id.
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See Lili Pike & Yao Zhe, Five Things to Know About China’s National Carbon Market,
CHINADIALOGUE (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/10303-Five-things-to-know-aboutChina-s-national-carbon-market/en; see also Jill Baker, All Eyes on China as National Carbon Market Plan
Emerges From Haze, ETHICAL CORP. (Sept. 1, 2019), http://www.ethicalcorp.com/all-eyes-china-nationalcarbon-market-plan-emerges-haze.
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In preparation for the official opening of its national carbon market in 2020,
China has been running seven pilot carbon markets throughout the country since
2013.110 These programs are intended to test whether the national carbon market
will be effective in reducing carbon emissions.111 In particular, through the pilot
markets, the Chinese government has attempted to enhance the regulatory and
administrative framework for its carbon market.112 Thus far, the pilot markets
appear to be working, as seen by the fact that the number of trades has
increased.113 Also, the pilot markets, especially the Beijing market, have been
effective in achieving a high compliance rate and have helped establish stable
carbon prices, which indicates effectiveness.114
Along the way, China has been able to implement a measurement, reporting,
and verification (MRV) system that requires all local governments to report their
carbon emission history. 115 The MRV system will enable the Chinese
government to effectively oversee carbon emissions when its national carbon
market is finally launched.116 Although there is a lot to be done in terms of
market infrastructure, it is evident that China has been endeavoring to create a
carbon market that works.117 Furthermore, this endeavor will likely continue, as
China’s commitment to develop an effective carbon market was reaffirmed by
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council,
both of which have repeatedly cited it as a top priority.118
D. India
In 2017, India was responsible for 6.8% of global CO2 emissions, and the
country was ranked the third-biggest carbon emitter in the world.119 Despite its
high levels of carbon emissions, India had shown little interest in setting up
mandatory emission targets before 2010.120 This was, perhaps, largely due to the
110
See What’s New with China’s National Carbon Market?, PAULSON INST. (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.paulsoninstitute.org/green-finance/green-scene/whats-new-with-chinas-national-carbon-market/.
The pilot markets have been operating in the following cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing,
Hubei, and Guangdong. Id.
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
Pike & Zhe, supra note 108.
114
See id.
115
PAULSON INST., supra note 110.
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
See id.
119
Ghosh, supra note 73.
120
MANASVINI VAIDYULA, KATHERINE RITTENHOUSE, PETER SOPHER, DANIEL FRANCIS, & JEFF SWARTZ,
INDIA: AN EMISSIONS TRADING CASE STUDY 2 (2015), https://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Case_Studies_
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prevailing belief in India that more developed countries were at fault for climate
change. 121 Therefore, instead of having a system based on reducing carbon
emissions, the country focused on reducing energy consumption in energyintensive industries through programs such as Perform, Achieve, and Trade
(PAT), which was first introduced in 2009 and went into effect in 2012.122
While the PAT scheme is not the same as a cap-and-trade program, they bear
many similarities.123 For example, although the PAT scheme does not directly
involve reducing carbon emissions, the scheme resembles a cap-and-trade
scheme in that it allows participating parties to trade so-called energy efficiency
certificates if the parties achieve excess energy saving, which ultimately
contributes to decreased carbon emissions. 124 Following the success of these
programs, it seems that India decided to take a more decisive action in combating
global warming, and in 2017, received $8 million USD from the World Bank for
designing and piloting a carbon market.125
E. South Korea
In 2017, South Korea was ranked ninth in CO2 emissions and responsible
for 1.7% of global carbon emissions.126 In recognition of the need to lower its
carbon footprint, South Korea launched a domestic carbon market in the
beginning of 2015, a result of the Act on Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Allowances.127 The carbon market is currently the second-largest
market—topped only by the European Union’s carbon market, which was
created by the EU ETS.128 Unlike RGGI, which covers only the power sector,
South Korea’s cap-and-trade program covers a broad range of CO2 emitting
industries. 129 The program covers not only the power sector, but also,

Worlds_Carbon_Markets/2015/india_case_study_may2015.pdf.
121
See id.
122
See id. at 1–2.
123
See id. at 2.
124
See Perform, Achieve, Trade (PAT) Scheme, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/policies/
1780-perform-achieve-trade-pat-scheme (June 5, 2019); see generally ASHWINI HINGNE, CARBON MARKETS IN
INDIA: EXPLORING PROSPECTS & DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 2018).
125
Chirag Gajjar, A Carbon Market to Drive India’s Climate Action, WRI INDIA (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://wri-india.org/blog/carbon-market-drive-india%E2%80%99s-climate-action.
126
See Ghosh, supra note 73.
127
See ASIAN DEV. BANK, THE KOREA EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: CHALLENGES AND EMERGING
OPPORTUNITIES 7 (Nov. 2018), https://think-asia.org/handle/11540/9341; see also INT’L CARBON ACTION
P’SHIP, supra note 12, at 1.
128
See Ghosh, supra note 73. If China’s national carbon market becomes operational, then South Korea’s
carbon market will be the third largest. Id.
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Cf. THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 75.
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transportation, aviation, and waste management sectors, among others. 130 As
such, the program has ended up covering about sixty six percent of South
Korea’s total carbon emissions.131
Like the EU ETS, South Korea’s cap-and-trade program divides the program
into different phases: Phase I (2015-2017), Phase II (2018-2020), and Phase III
(2021-2025).132 Just as the EU ETS was able to reflect market deficiencies in
previous phases, South Korea’s cap-and-trade program has also been able to
evaluate previous phases and make adjustments for the upcoming phases so as
to improve the overall carbon market.
For example, during Phase I, South Korea’s cap-and-trade program was
governed by various governmental entities. 133 As such, the cap-and-trade
program failed to voice a single message that would have provided better
instruction to market participants.134 This created uncertainty in the market and
caused market participants to become hesitant in actively engaging in carbon
permit transactions during Phase I. 135 Recognizing this market deficiency in
Phase I, the government of South Korea decided to restructure its oversight
system by placing more responsibilities on the Ministry of Environment.136
Below is another example of how the government of South Korea has tried
to improve its carbon market. The problem South Korea sought to correct
occurred during an early stage of the implementation of its cap-and-trade
program. 137 The problem related to the low carbon permit prices set by the
market.138 In South Korea, coal power plants were largely responsible for carbon
emissions; therefore, it was important to bring power plants into the plan.139 Due
to poorly designed regulatory policies in the first year of the market, however,
South Korea’s cap-and-trade program was unable to effectively impact coal

130

See ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 127, at 13.
MANASVINI VAIDYULA, KATHERINE RITTENHOUSE, PETER SOPHER, DANIEL FRANCIS, & JEFF SWARTZ,
supra note 120, at 2.
132
ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 127, at 8.
133
Id. at xii.
134
Id.
135
See id.
136
See id. at 9.
137
See Yongrok Choi & Chao Qi, Is South Korea’s Emission Trading Scheme Effective? An Analysis
Based on the Marginal Abatement Cost of Coal-Fueled Power Plants, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 10 (Apr. 29, 2019).
138
See id.
139
PAOLA YANGUAS PARRA ET AL., TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A COAL-FREE SOCIETY: SCIENCE BASED
COAL-PHASE OUT PATHWAY FOR SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT 6 (2020), https://
climateanalytics.org/media/south_korea_coal_phase_out_feb17_eng.pdf.
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power plants, resulting in low carbon permit prices.140 The carbon permit price
was “too low to encourage coal-fueled power plants to actively participate in the
carbon emissions-trading market.”141 In addition, the permit price was too low
to induce the power plants to develop innovations for cutting carbon
emissions. 142 As a result, low carbon permit prices impeded the effective
operation of the carbon market.143
Although adjustments were made to regulatory policies to improve the
carbon market after the first year, there are still problems with South Korea’s
carbon market that have yet to be resolved. 144 One problem is the lack of
liquidity in the carbon market, meaning that the expected trading behavior in the
market has not occurred due to the small number of market participants. 145
Because of the lack of market liquidity, carbon permit prices have become more
susceptible to changes, and therefore, have fluctuated quite drastically.146 To
make the situation worse, because the market participants have expected a
carbon permit price surge, many have attempted to hold their carbon permits in
anticipation of higher prices in the future.147 This again has led to a shortage of
available carbon permits on the market.148 Ultimately, uncertainty in the carbon
market of South Korea has greatly increased, leading to ineffectiveness and
volatility in the Korean carbon market as a whole.149
Nonetheless, the problem inherent in a single carbon market can potentially
be resolved by linking one country’s cap-and-trade program with cap-and-trade
programs of other countries, an approach that will be covered in Section IV.C.1.
III. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING
It cannot be emphasized enough how important each individual
government’s efforts are in reducing carbon emissions. However, in combating
climate change, international cooperation is just as important as each
government’s efforts. Because global warming results from the total carbon

140
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emissions produced by every country in the world, the goal of halting global
warming is unlikely to be achieved without collaboration within the
international community. As the importance of international collaboration has
become more widely recognized, more countries have worked together to
produce agreements related to global warming. Indeed, several such agreements
have been reached within recent history, including three major multilateral
agreements.
A. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The first of these multilateral agreements, and the one that has become the
foundation for other international agreements regarding global warming, is the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which
went into effect in 1994. 150 This agreement was joined and ratified by 197
countries. 151 The importance of the framework lies in the fact that it
“[r]ecognized that there was a problem[]” in spite of limited technologies
available at the time to corroborate such an assertion and “kick[ed] off formal
consideration of adaptation to climate change.”152 Article 2 of the UNFCCC
states the main objective of the agreement, which was to “stabilize greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”153
Furthermore, the UNFCCC demands that developed countries, called Annex
I countries, undertake a key role in leading this initiative to combat climate
change.154 Even though many of the countries have successfully fulfilled their
responsibilities, one drawback to the framework is that it lacked an enforcement
mechanism, which could have been helpful in realizing its main objective.155
This deficiency, as well as the UNFCCC’s guideline as to how subsequent
international treaties or protocols may be negotiated led to the establishment of
another significant international agreement that compelled developed countries
to take action.156

150
UNFCCC, What is the United Stations Framework Convention on Climate Change?, https://unfccc.int/
process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change.
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UNFCCC, Climate Get the Big Picture, https://unfccc.int/resource/bigpicture; see also United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2.
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See id. at 7.
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about-us/unfccc (last visited May 30, 2020).
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B. The Kyoto Protocol
The second major international agreement regarding global warming was the
Kyoto Protocol. The protocol was adopted in 1997 and became effective in
2005.157 As opposed to the UNFCCC, which was effective only to the extent that
the agreement encouraged state parties to take some action to prevent global
warming, the Kyoto Protocol committed state parties to reducing their carbon
emissions. 158 Importantly, the protocol had a binding effect on developed
countries with regard to setting emission reduction targets.159 Furthermore, the
Kyoto Protocol was significant in that it recognized different responsibilities of
countries with regard to global warming by taking into account differences in
past industrial activities, in accordance with the principle of “common but
differentiated responsibilities.”160
Although countries should focus on reducing domestic emissions, the
protocol provides countries with flexibility in determining ways to meet their
emission targets.161 The Kyoto Protocol provides countries with three options to
achieve reduction targets: (1) International Emission Trading, (2) Joint
Implementation projects, and (3) the Clean Development Mechanism. 162
Emission trading refers to the cap-and-trade program. 163 Alternatively, Joint
Implementation projects and the Clean Development Mechanism are credit
programs.164
According to Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation projects
allow Annex I countries to meet their reduction commitments by investing in a
carbon dioxide reduction project in other Annex I countries.165 By following this
option, a country can receive credits, “emission reduction units,” for reducing
emissions in another country.166 This option may better allow Annex I countries
to cost-effectively satisfy their reduction targets because investments in
emission reduction projects of other Annex I countries can be relatively cheaper

157

UNFCCC, What is the Kyoto Protocol?, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
See UNFCCC, supra note 153.
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Stavins, supra note 16, at 367.
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than lowering carbon dioxide emissions domestically. 167 Furthermore, Joint
Implementation promotes conveyance of environment-friendly technologies
from one country to another. 168 Notwithstanding the fact that Joint
Implementation is indeed cost-effective in achieving reduction targets, acquiring
emission reduction units must be “supplemental to domestic actions” when it
comes to meeting reduction targets.169
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the last flexible option
provided by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows non-Annex I countries to
earn “certified emission reductions” (CERs) by developing carbon dioxide
emission reduction projects in developing countries. 170 In other words, nonAnnex I countries could support developing countries both financially and
technologically so as to better accomplish the main purpose of the Kyoto
Protocol: lowering the aggregate carbon emissions.171 The earned credits, CERs,
could then be applied to a country’s reduction targets.172 The mechanisms of the
Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism are pretty much
the same, but they differ with respect to which countries can implement either
one of the schemes.173 Just like Joint Implementation, acquiring CERs must also
be “supplemental to domestic actions.”174
The Kyoto Protocol also establishes a compliance mechanism to ensure that
state parties to the protocol meet their reduction targets.175 The mechanism calls
for the creation of a compliance committee, consisting of two branches: 1) a
facilitative branch and 2) an enforcement branch.176 The role of the facilitative
branch is to provide assistance to countries when they have problems in
achieving their emission targets, while the role of the enforcement branch is to
ensure that countries meet their emission targets by determining the
consequences for non-compliance.177
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If a country fails to meet its emission reduction targets under the Kyoto
Protocol, that country must submit a plan explaining how it intends to establish
future compliance with the protocol.178 As a penalty, the country must reduce
carbon dioxide emissions in the upcoming commitment period by the same
amount that they failed to reduce carbon emissions in the previous period; the
country is furthermore required to decrease thirty percent of the emissions that
the country failed to achieve in the previous period.179 As a final consequence
for failing to meet its reduction commitments, the country will forfeit its right to
sell its carbon permits to other countries.180
C. The Paris Agreement
The third major international agreement on the topic of global warming is
the Paris Agreement, which entered into force in November 2016.181 The Paris
Agreement went one step further than the Kyoto Protocol by requiring every
country that ratified the agreement—not just developed countries—to take
action to cut carbon dioxide emissions.182 The main goal of this agreement is to
“hold[] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels . . .”183 In order to achieve the goal, the Paris
Agreement places an emphasis on international cooperation in combating global
warming by stipulating in Article 2.1 that, the Paris Agreement “aims to
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change[.]”184
Of great importance in the Paris Agreement are the Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs). 185 Article 3 of the Paris Agreement demands that the
NDCs be “ambitious.”186 In addition, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement requires
state parties to “prepare, communicate, and maintain” NDCs; this means that
state parties have to regularly update their emission status and how they are
making an effort in reducing carbon emissions.187 Essentially, NDCs are plans
178
Jon Hovi, et al., Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: Can Punitive Consequences Restore Compliance?, 33
REV. INT’L STUDIES 3, 435, 439 (July 2007).
179
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180
Id.
181
United Nations Climate Change, What is the Paris Agreement? https://unfccc.int/process-andmeetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
182
See Melissa Denchak, Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know, NRDC (Dec. 12,
2018), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/paris-climate-agreement-everything-you-need-know#sec-important.
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Paris Agreement, art. 2.1(a).
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for identifying how a country will contribute to realizing the ultimate goal of the
agreement as prescribed in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.188
Furthermore, just as in the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris agreement also
recognizes and emphasizes “the need to support developing country Parties for
the effective implementation of this Agreement.” 189 Accordingly, it obliges
developed countries to provide financial support to developing countries
pursuant to Article 9, Section 1 of the Paris Agreement, stating, “[d]eveloped
country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country
Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their
existing obligations under the Convention.”190
IV. EVER-CHANGING GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPAND-TRADE PROGRAMS IN RELATION TO SOUTH KOREA’S COMPLIANCE WITH

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. Difficulties Involved with Changing Climate Policies in Different Countries
Countries’ policies regarding global warming are inherently interdependent.
If one country reduces carbon emissions while another country increases carbon
emissions by the same amount, the total amount of carbon emitted will remain
the same. For this reason, every country must work together to tackle the
problem of global warming.
In practice, it is quite difficult to find viable solutions to such a complex
problem. Regardless of countries’ commitments to various international
agreements, the policies of each country are susceptible to changes depending
on domestic politics.191 In June 2017, for example, President Trump announced
that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. 192
Moreover, carbon emission regulations in the United States have been made
188

See Paris Agreement, art. 4.2.
Paris Agreement, art. 3.
190
Paris Agreement, art. 9.1.
191
See, e.g., Justin Worland, Trump Announces Withdrawal From Paris Agreement, TIME (June 1, 2017),
https://time.com/4801134/paris-agreement-withdrawal-donald-trump-rose-garden; Juliet Eilperin & Brady
Dennis, Trump Administration to Relax Restrictions on Methane, a Powerful Greenhouse Gas, WASH. POST
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/08/29/trump-administrationreverse-limits-methane-powerful-greenhouse-gas/; Timothy Gardner, EPA to Relax Fuel Efficiency Standards
for Autos, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-epa-autos/epa-to-relax-fuelefficiency-standards-for-autos-idUSKCN1H91OD; Ellie Kaufman, EPA Rolls Back Obama-era Plan Limiting
Coal-Fired Power Plant Emissions, CNN (June 19, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/19/politics/epa-rollsback-obama-coal-emissions/index.html.
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significantly less stringent.193 As evidence of this fact, the EPA recently allowed
states to establish their own emission standards for coal-fired power plants and
reduced fuel efficiency standards for automobiles. 194 In addition, the Trump
administration sued California for linking its cap-and-trade system to a foreign
province, Quebec.195
Such changes in policy show how a country with a large carbon footprint
can make a big difference in terms of global carbon emissions. Even slight policy
changes in the United States, a major CO2 emitter, could undermine efforts of
smaller countries, like South Korea, to reduce carbon levels in the atmosphere
and mitigate the impact of global warming.196 Unfortunately, smaller countries
that try hard to protect the environment often have limited power to change the
environmental policies of larger or more powerful nations.
Periodic fluctuation in climate policies in various countries prevents
international cooperation towards reducing carbon emissions. Therefore, it is
important that South Korea develops ways to attack the problem of global
warming head-on while continuing to encourage other nations to take a similar
approach.
B. Problems in South Korea Regarding Compliance with the Paris Agreement
In addition to the ever-changing environmental policies, South Korea itself
is having trouble with respect to its emission reduction target under the Paris
Agreement. 197 South Korea committed to the Paris Agreement to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions by signing the Agreement on April 22, 2016.198 In
accordance with its obligations under the Agreement, South Korea proposed that
it would decrease carbon emissions by thirty seven percent below its businessas-usual level by 2030, a figure that could be achieved through a 32.5% domestic
emission reduction and a 4.5% of international emission reduction.199
193
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Nevertheless, according to the Climate Action Tracker, an independent
agency that measures the effectiveness of governmental climate action, South
Korea’s emission target was rated as “highly insufficient” when compared to the
aims of the Paris Agreement.200 The Climate Action Tracker defines “highly
insufficient” emission targets as those that “fall outside the fair share range and
are not at all consistent with holding warming to below 2°C let alone with the
Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit.”201 By rating South Korea’s emission
reduction target as “highly insufficient,” the Climate Action Tracker emphasized
the need for more rigorous and ambitious approaches in helping achieve the
main objective of the Paris Agreement.202
C. Suggested Policies
Despite such unfavorable circumstances and domestic problems inhibiting
the development of South Korea’s cap-and-trade program as outlined in Section
II.E, it should be noted that Korea’s ability to shape the future is bolstered by
the fact that it has the second-largest carbon market in the world.203 Moreover,
there are several policies that South Korea can implement with respect to the
cap-and-trade system so as to continue being a responsible party to several
international agreements on global warming.204
One policy would be for South Korea to further restrict its own carbon cap.
Doing so would both cope with changes in environmental policies that occur in
other countries and better comply with the Paris Agreement. Additionally, there
are two particularly important policies that would enable South Korea to
considerably lower its CO2 emissions while complying with the spirit of
international agreements through international cooperation. 205 These two
policies are: (1) the linkage of the cap-and-trade system and (2) economic aid to
developing countries.206
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1. Linkage with Other Countries’ Cap-and-trade Programs
One way to alleviate global warming is through linkage of carbon markets
between regions or countries. There are clear benefits to operating cap-and-trade
programs together, both regionally and internationally.207 California’s linkage
of its cap-and-trade program with that of Quebec, for example, resulted in a net
reduction of carbon dioxide.208 Even though RGGI is a regional linkage system,
it is still a combined carbon market insofar as it is a combination of carbon
markets from different states.209 Accordingly, RGGI provides another example
of how linking cap-and-trade programs can be highly effective. 210 This
effectiveness is backed by other existing models of carbon market linkage.211
For example, in Switzerland, which is not a part of the European Union, a capand-trade program is already in place that links Switzerland’s carbon market to
the EU ETS.212 The benefits of linking cap-and-trade systems so as to create
bigger carbon markets are explained below.
a. Benefits of Linkage
Linking cap-and-trade systems of different countries provides a variety of
advantages. 213 First, as more polluting parties participate in the expanded
market, transactions involving carbon permits become more effective and
liquid.214 Due to the increased number of market participants, more trading will
happen in the market, and therefore, big fluctuations in carbon permit prices are
less likely.215 As a result, confidence in the market will increase, and there will
be less market volatility. 216 Eventually, overall market efficiency will be
enhanced.217 Thus, through linkage of carbon markets, South Korea would be
able to solve many of the problems relating to market efficiency that have
plagued its carbon market since it was first implemented in 2015.218
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Second, linkage of cap-and-trade programs provides participating parties
with benefits.219 In particular, a country with a higher compliance cost would
benefit from having reduced costs for carbon emission reduction, while a
country with a relatively lower compliance cost would benefit by being able to
raise money.220 That is, linkage with other countries’ cap-and-trade programs
allows participating states to cost-efficiently meet emission reduction targets.221
According to a study that was conducted before the launching of CaliforniaQuebec’s linked carbon market, it was anticipated that both California and
Quebec would benefit from connecting their carbon markets.222 This conclusion
was based on the fact that, because Quebec utilized hydroelectric resources to
generate power, and as a result, maintained lower emission intensity than
California, Quebec incurred relatively higher costs associated with decreasing
carbon emissions.223
In the absence of a linked carbon market, the carbon permit prices in Quebec
were expected to be approximately $37-43 per metric ton of CO2 in 2013,
increasing to $59-69 per metric ton of CO2 by 2020. 224 In contrast, it was
estimated that carbon permit prices in California would be in the range of $1736 per metric ton of CO2 in 2013, subsequently increasing to $27-54 per metric
ton of CO2 by 2020.225 The study, therefore, predicted that if the markets in
California and Quebec were connected, a slight increase in carbon permit prices
would be expected.226
By looking at these predicted permit prices, the study showed that entities in
need of carbon permits in Quebec would be better off by having cheaper options
to reduce their carbon emissions.227 Despite the slight increase over its carbon
permit price, California would benefit from earning revenue generated from
entities in Quebec that had purchased permits from California. 228 California
could invest this additional revenue in developing more environment-friendly
technologies that would emit less carbon dioxide.229 Although these predictions
219
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were made before the carbon markets in California and Quebec were connected,
time has prove them to be fairly accurate.230 For instance, through the carbon
permit auction held in 2019, California was able to raise over $740 million USD
with which they could invest in further reducing carbon emissions.231
Implementing a linked cap-and-trade program in South Korea would likely
yield similar economic advantages for prospective participants. South Korea
could benefit from buying cheaper permits abroad, and at the same time, raise
money by selling permits to other countries, the proceeds of which could be used
to fund environmental initiatives.232
If China’s carbon market takes effect in 2020 and China agrees to link its
carbon market, then South Korea could enjoy cheaper prices while decreasing
carbon emissions. 233 Alternatively, if South Korea sells permits to other
countries whose compliance costs are higher, then South Korea could benefit
from selling its carbon permits.234 If complying with its emission targets under
the Paris Agreement becomes cheaper, South Korea could make additional
reductions by utilizing saved resources. Furthermore, it would be able to set and
achieve more ambitious emission reductions under the Paris Agreement so as to
resolve the concerns proposed by the Climate Change Tracker.235
As an added benefit, linking the cap-and-trade programs of different
countries would be a major step towards realizing the spirit of international
cooperation upon which the Paris Agreement was created, as emphasized by
Article 2.1. 236 Furthermore, ambitious reduction targets that would not be
possible if countries acted alone would become achievable through international
cooperation and coordination.237
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After China’s carbon market opens up in 2020, South Korea could suggest
linking its carbon market with China’s, which soon would be the largest carbon
market in the world.238 Professor Duan, who has been actively participating in
the development of China’s national carbon market, said that, “China wishes to
develop a national system with great international influence and hopes to link its
system with others.”239 This suggests the future possibility of linking carbon
markets in China and South Korea. Furthermore, if Asian countries such as
China, India, Russia, Japan, and South Korea could work together to create an
Asian carbon market, this market could have a tremendous impact on helping to
mitigate global warming.240 After all, these countries are responsible for almost
half of the global carbon emissions according to data from 2019.241
The linkage of cap-and-trade programs is not limited to neighboring
countries.242 Countries can look to neighboring or even distant countries to form
partnerships—without being discouraged by geographical distance. 243 As
proven by the linked carbon markets of California and Quebec, a large distance
between countries should not preclude them from joining together to strengthen
emission standards.244 Therefore, South Korea should seek out any countries
that are willing to connect their carbon markets with South Korea’s carbon
market.
Due to the aforementioned benefits of linking carbon markets—improved
market liquidity, reduced compliance and transaction costs, and contribution to
international collaboration—South Korea will be able to address the problems
that were mentioned in Section IV. South Korea should therefore seriously
consider linking its cap-and-trade program with the cap-and-trade programs of
other countries.
b. Potential Challenges Regarding Linkage of Carbon Markets
There are potential obstacles with regard to linking cap-and-trade programs
of different countries. First, adjustments may have to be made to account for
different cap-and-trade programs, and this could prove challenging. 245 In
238
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making adjustments, countries have to take into account different factors,
including economic and political factors, and finally, compromise. 246 The
differences between the countries with respect to these factors might hinder the
linkage of countries’ cap-and-trade programs.
However, this might not be such a big problem when looking at the
California–Quebec carbon market. When California and Quebec considered
linking their carbon markets, they did not go through several rounds of
negotiation. Instead of fighting against each other, which would have raised
issues previously mentioned, they focused on scrutinizing each other’s
regulatory provisions so as to make sure that the provisions in both programs
were mutually beneficial.
Specifically, California and Quebec divided their respective cap-and-trade
programs’ provisions into three basic categories: (1) identical provisions, (2)
non-identical provisions with similar outcomes, and (3) entirely different
provisions.247 The first category includes the number of carbon permits allowed
in the market, a common registry, and rules that govern the transfer of carbon
permits in the linked market.248 The second category includes the monitoring,
reporting, and verification processes. 249 The last category includes voluntary
offset programs that have already been implemented by each country prior to
consideration of the linked market. 250 This division into separate categories
facilitated conversation between the two parties, and ultimately, made linking
markets much easier. If other countries who enter into negotiations follow a
similar model, they will be able to enjoy the benefits of a linked market while
overcoming some of the more obvious obstacles.
Furthermore, there is the possibility that such programs will encourage
outsourcing of carbon emissions, which might result in an increase in total global
carbon emissions.251 This is called carbon leakage.252 Because a country can
satisfy reduction targets at a cheaper cost by buying relatively cheaper permits
from other countries whose carbon markets are linked to its market, the country
may continue emitting lots of carbon dioxide while still meeting its reduction
Learning from Experience 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19824, 2014).
246
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247
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target. 253 In addition, it is possible that such programs will disincentivize
technological innovations aimed at achieving carbon efficiency. 254 Due to
having cheaper options arising from the linked carbon market, a country might
have less incentives to create innovations that would greatly cut carbon
emissions.255
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the benefits of linked cap-and-trade
programs vastly outweigh the costs. The evidence includes numerous examples
of existing linked carbon markets around the world. The California-Quebec
carbon market is an example of how countries can smoothly negotiate and
successfully create a linked carbon market. South Korea should suggest to other
countries that have already implemented cap-and-trade programs, or which are
considering implementing cap-and-trade programs, to link their cap-and-trade
programs to take advantage of the benefits of expanded carbon markets.
2. Contributing Financial Assistance to Other Countries
In addition to linking its carbon market with those of other countries, South
Korea could contribute funds to other developing countries to encourage those
countries to set up their own cap-and-trade programs.256 For example, Indonesia
has yet to establish its own carbon market, but the country is ranked twelfth in
amount of carbon produced in 2017.257 Therefore, by implementing a policy of
subsidizing Indonesia to help them establish their carbon market, South Korea
may be able to better contribute to the battle of combating climate change and
environmental damage caused by global warming.
This approach closely resembles the Clean Development Mechanism, one of
the options to satisfy reduction targets provided by the Kyoto Protocol.258 Since
South Korea is classified as a non-Annex I country under the Kyoto Protocol,
South Korea is not eligible for the Joint Implementation project as described in
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.259 Despite this fact, South Korea can still utilize
the Clean Development Mechanism.260
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In addition, this approach could be a good way to mitigate global warming
because it expands the potential pool of countries to which South Korea could
link its cap-and-trade program. Furthermore, rather than simply providing
financial support, South Korea can also help countries establish a viable carbon
market by sharing the lessons that have been learned from its experience in this
field.
Lastly, offering financial assistance to other countries in an effort to
encourage them to establish their own carbon markets is fully consistent with
the spirit of the two major international agreements: the Kyoto Protocol and the
Paris Agreement. 261 As mentioned above, these international agreements
emphasize the needs and responsibilities of developed countries to help
developing countries in combatting climate change by providing the financial
means necessary to achieve such an important goal. 262 Therefore, it is
recommended that South Korea contribute funds to countries that are struggling
to decide which instrument to implement as a means of reducing carbon
emissions. This way South Korea can fully realize the spirit of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Paris Agreement while simultaneously working to achieve
carbon reduction.
CONCLUSION
To address the urgent need to remedy the problem of global warming, every
country must make their best efforts to mitigate any impacts that would worsen
this devastating problem. With the understanding of the importance of national
efforts, many countries around the world have implemented cap-and-trade as a
way of reducing carbon emissions. In addition, three major international
agreements encourage a concerted response to global warming. This is because
greater reductions in global carbon emissions will not be possible without
cooperative efforts of the international community due to the transnational
nature of global warming.
Undeniably, there have been cases where certain countries have gone against
the efforts of other countries in mitigating the hazardous impacts of global
warming, in spite of evidence that international cooperation is paramount. This,
unfortunately, discourages efforts of countries that are trying hard to lower
carbon emissions. It is a situation that sometimes occurs in countries emitting
less carbon dioxide, where emission reductions may easily be surpassed by
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carbon dioxide emissions of larger, non-cooperative nations.
However, by employing policies suggested herein, South Korea could
alleviate the harm caused by countries that are deviating from global efforts to
remediate global warming as well as solve its own problems related to the carbon
market. First, South Korea should link its cap-and-trade program with those of
other countries. Second, South Korea should also provide financial support to
other countries to help them establish their own cap-and-trade programs. In so
doing, South Korea would be better able to comply with international
agreements related to global warming and more effectively support global
efforts to combat climate change.
Furthermore, these suggestions are not only applicable to South Korea, but
also to other countries of similar size and which have a similar level of carbon
emissions. Even though this Comment focuses on addressing problems inherent
in South Korea’s cap-and-trade programs, the problems are not atypical. Other
countries might experience similar difficulties in attempting to establish or
improve their carbon markets. Therefore, these two suggested solutions should
apply not only to South Korea, but also to other situations where similar
circumstances arise. Other countries are welcome to adopt these solutions and
to improve their own cap-and-trade programs. The implementation of these
suggestions will help reduce carbon emissions worldwide, and to this end,
should be considered seriously for the future of our planet. Countries around the
globe must find ways to work together for their own mutual benefit. Only then
will we be able to better address the seemingly insurmountable obstacles related
to global warming.
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